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    <title>NatSec Noir</title>
    <link>https://natsecnoir.com/</link>
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    <description>What the public record reveals: a curated corpus of regulatory and litigation documents spanning national security, tech, and AI.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>Robotics and Power Inverters Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-robotics-and-power-inverters-covered-list-d605d1/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-robotics-and-power-inverters-covered-list-d605d1/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices to the FCC Covered List based on Executive Branch national-security determinations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List to include “Foreign-produced power inverters,” except devices granted a Conditional Approval by the Department of War (DoW) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and “Foreign-produced advanced robotic devices,” except devices granted a DoW Conditional Approval. It adopts the determinations’ definitions and explains that foreign production, rather than identification of a particular entity, defines these new categories. It also describes submission and evaluation processes for Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Foreign producers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications and infrastructure businesses using covered equipment are affected. Covered equipment is prohibited from receiving FCC equipment authorization, and applicants must certify that equipment is not covered. The notice states that the new category-based entries do not trigger rules applying to entities identified on the Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action extends the Covered List beyond named companies to power-grid equipment and networked robotic systems. The cited risks include lack of secure U.S. supply chain, supply-chain disruption, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, remote manipulation, surveillance, data exfiltration, and threats to critical infrastructure and U.S. persons. The notice also republishes the broader updated list, including prior telecommunications, surveillance, cybersecurity, UAS, and router entries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released and Covered List updated: July 28, 2026 (the catalogue date is recorded as July 28, 2028).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;National Security Determinations transmitted to the FCC: July 27, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;New entries: foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant rules: 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003, 2.903(a), and 2.911(d)(5)(i).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OET Permissive Change Waiver - Robotics Power Inverters</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-permissive-change-waiver-robotics-power-inve-773dde/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-permissive-change-waiver-robotics-power-inve-773dde/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Office of Engineering and Technology waives, through at least January 1, 2029, specified prohibitions on Class I and Class II permissive changes for previously authorized covered foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET waives the prohibitions in 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) for software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers, including updates that patch vulnerabilities, preserve device functionality, or facilitate compatibility with different operating systems. The relief applies only to devices authorized before the July 28, 2026 additions to the Covered List, and covers both Class I and Class II permissive changes. Grantees must continue to comply with other applicable FCC requirements, including Class II information and testing rules, performance requirements, marketing restrictions, and certification obligations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The waiver affects authorized foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters newly designated as covered equipment. It does not authorize new equipment or eliminate other FCC compliance duties. The power-inverter category excludes devices granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS; the advanced-robotic-device category excludes devices granted a Conditional Approval by DoW.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without the waiver, the Covered List additions could prevent already-authorized devices from receiving security and functionality updates. OET found that special circumstances and the public interest justify temporary relief to support continued safe operation and mitigate risks to U.S. consumers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 28, 2026; DA 26-789.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List additions and waiver effective July 28, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relief extends at least until January 1, 2029.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Rules addressed: 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e558e5/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e558e5/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that Department of War Conditional Approval exempts SpaceX Services, Inc.’s Starlink routers from the FCC Covered List, subject to a February 1, 2028 termination date.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice explains that the Commission added foreign-produced routers to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, while excluding routers granted Conditional Approval by the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. It determines that the Department of War approval is a “specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks and updates the Covered List and Conditional Approvals appendix accordingly. The notice also republishes the current Covered List and identifies other router approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects SpaceX’s Starlink routers and entities that manufacture, test, authorize, deploy, or procure foreign-produced routers. The appended approval table identifies products from Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Sagemcom, Miri, Arcadyan, Hitron, and other manufacturers with specified approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice clarifies how executive-branch Conditional Approvals change the scope of the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions and preserves staff guidance for test labs, Telecommunications Certification Bodies, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 27, 2026; DA 26-775.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Starlink Conditional Approval: July 27, 2026–February 1, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Governing rules: 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-b741bf/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-b741bf/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau excludes specified uncrewed aircraft systems and router classes from the Covered List because the Department of War granted Conditional Approvals for those devices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix under 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003. The newly approved equipment includes Exedy Globalparts Corporation’s Ayre CX UAS, Parallel Flight Technologies’ Firefly UAS, Calix’s GigaSpire class routers and Giga Pro, Sagemcom’s “FAST” Broadband Class of Gateways and Routers, Humax’s HNR2306 and HNRM30 routers, and Askey’s ASK-NCM300 and ASK-NCQ8000 Wi-Fi 8 Gateways. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List as of July 24, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The exclusions affect the named manufacturers and their specified products, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications equipment businesses that rely on the Covered List. Exemptions remain conditional; for UAS, continued effectiveness depends on compliance with an approved onshoring plan and updated product vetting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and Conditional Approvals modify the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions without removing the underlying categories of foreign-produced UAS, UAS components, or routers from the Covered List. A Conditional Approval may end, and a device may return to the list, if required conditions are violated or the government finds false statements or misrepresentations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 24, 2026; DA 26-768.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Newly listed router approvals terminate November 22, 2027 for Calix, December 5, 2027 for Sagemcom, and January 17, 2028 for Humax and Askey.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List exemptions for Blue UAS and qualifying domestic end products run until January 1, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shenzhen STS -CopyPaste-2 Order to Show Cause</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-shenzhen-sts-copypaste-2-order-to-show-cause-e823b0/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-shenzhen-sts-copypaste-2-order-to-show-cause-e823b0/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology institutes a proceeding to withdraw Shenzhen STS Test Services Co. Ltd.’s recognition as an accredited test laboratory based on its tentative determination that the laboratory willfully submitted false or inaccurate equipment test results.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET identifies repeated identical test data in reports submitted for wholly different products and tentatively finds at least 40 incorrect or falsified reports. It concludes that the conduct may violate Section 302(e) of the Communications Act and FCC rules requiring accurate test-data attestations and prohibiting materially incorrect or misleading information. The Order directs Shenzhen STS to show cause why its laboratory recognition should not be withdrawn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding directly affects Shenzhen STS, a Shenzhen, China laboratory recognized by the FCC in 2017 and accredited by the American Association for Laboratory Accreditation. It also bears on equipment applicants whose authorization filings relied on the laboratory’s reports, including filings associated with numerous smartphones, tablets, headsets, earbuds, diagnostic devices, modules, and other products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action tests the integrity of the FCC equipment-authorization system and the reliability of third-party laboratory certifications. Withdrawal of recognition could prevent Shenzhen STS from continuing to serve as an FCC-recognized test laboratory, but the Order is preliminary and provides an opportunity to respond.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released July 21, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Response due within 35 calendar days after release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;OET states that approximately 4,100 applications used Shenzhen STS reports; its search cited 4,134 results.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Order identifies at least 40 potentially incorrect or falsified reports and lists FCC IDs in 20 groupings.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Odyssey Robot Order to Show Cause</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-odyssey-robot-order-to-show-cause-9abf1e/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-odyssey-robot-order-to-show-cause-9abf1e/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) initiate a proceeding requiring Odyssey Robot LLC to show cause why the Commission should not revoke two equipment authorizations that the bureaus tentatively find were obtained through false representations concerning Covered List equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Order to Show Cause concerns FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD, an uncrewed aircraft system (UAS), and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD, its remote controller. OET and PSHSB tentatively determine that both devices are Covered UAS or UAS critical components produced in a foreign country and therefore were improperly authorized. The order alleges that Odyssey certified the equipment was not prohibited covered equipment and submitted supporting materials representing that the devices were developed, designed, and manufactured in California and assembled by eTak in Texas. eTak later denied any relationship with Odyssey or any assembly work. The order proceeds under section 2.939(d) of the FCC rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Odyssey and its two equipment authorizations. It also addresses eTak’s role in Odyssey’s representations and follows FCC inquiries into Odyssey’s business structure, manufacturing, affiliations, and compliance practices. The order gives Odyssey notice and an opportunity to respond; it does not itself make a final revocation determination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding illustrates the FCC’s enforcement of prohibitions on authorizing Covered List equipment and its reliance on applicant attestations. Failure to respond, or failure to provide a reasonable basis against revocation, may result in cancellation of the authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released July 21, 2026; DA 26-746.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 26-186.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Odyssey received certification grants on March 24, 2026, and April 20, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Odyssey must file a written response within 10 calendar days of release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The FCC’s Covered List addition for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components was made December 22, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-8cede6/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-8cede6/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PSHSB announces that two routers received Department of War Conditional Approval and therefore are exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and the associated Conditional Approvals appendix to exclude Gryphon Safety Online, Inc.’s Parental Control WiFi Router and Sercomm Corporation’s Air4992 Wi-Fi 7 Router. PSHSB finds that each approval is a “specific determination” that the device does not pose risks to U.S. national security, and says the Commission is required to update the list accordingly. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List and identifies the devices’ approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Gryphon and Sercomm and entities that manufacture, test, authorize, purchase, or use the identified routers. It also provides guidance for telecommunications certification bodies, test laboratories, and equipment-authorization applicants. The notice concerns the Covered List regime for routers produced in foreign countries, while preserving the general list’s other covered equipment and services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates how Executive Branch Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List without removing the general router category. It clarifies that qualifying devices are exempt only through the applicable approval and highlights the Commission’s duty to maintain and monitor the list under its rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 20, 2026; DA 26-756.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Both Conditional Approvals run through January 10, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PN Seeking Comment on Marketing Import Limit Drone Clones</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-marketing-import-limit-dro-7ae191/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-marketing-import-limit-dro-7ae191/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology propose limiting existing equipment authorizations to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of specified covered UAS, UAS critical components, and section 1709 communications and video-surveillance equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice seeks comment on applying 47 CFR § 2.939(e) to equipment produced by Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, WaveGo, Xtra, and XAG. It identifies covered devices and FCC ID ranges, while tentatively concluding that the equipment presents national-security risks and that the prohibitions serve the public interest. The proposal would not revoke underlying authorizations or bar continued operation of already-purchased equipment. It would also exclude federal-government use, commercial testing and product development, and equipment exempted from the Covered List through the Blue UAS Cleared List, Buy American treatment, or Conditional Approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proposal directly affects the named manufacturers and their affiliates, importers, distributors, retailers, marketers, equipment users, and other interested parties. Existing owners could continue using covered devices, but affected commercial supply-chain participants would need to stop importation and marketing if the proposal is adopted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice extends the FCC’s post-authorization Covered List framework to equipment added in 2025, emphasizing risks involving unauthorized surveillance, data exfiltration, and supply-chain vulnerabilities. It also invites evidence on economic and supply-chain effects and on whether trusted domestic alternatives can replace the identified products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 17, 2026; comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed cessation of importation and marketing: 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covers equipment associated with nine named entities, including XAG FCC IDs beginning with 2A46G, and specified FCC IDs for the other entities.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The proceeding is PS Docket No. 26-184 and DA 26-742.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e64105/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e64105/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that the Department of War granted Conditional Approval for Gemtek Technology Co., Ltd.’s WRTQ-411BE and WNRFQQ-113BE routers, requiring their exclusion from the FCC Covered List through the approval period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice explains that foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to an exception for routers receiving Conditional Approval from the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. PSHSB determines that the DoW approval is a “specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks and updates the Covered List accordingly. Appendices provide the July 10, 2026 Covered List and the broader list of equipment with Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The immediate action benefits Gemtek and users, test labs, certification bodies, and equipment-authorization applicants dealing with the two named router models. The notice also records existing conditional approvals for routers from companies including Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Alpha Networks, Sagemcom, Miri, Arcadyan, Hitron, and Vantiva. Covered List entities, affiliates, and subsidiaries remain subject to applicable FCC restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how executive-branch national-security determinations can modify the scope of the FCC Covered List without eliminating the general foreign-router category. It also makes approval periods central to compliance: the Gemtek exemption is time-limited, and FCC staff will provide guidance on the update.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 10, 2026: release date and Covered List update.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: foreign-produced routers added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 3, 2028: Gemtek Conditional Approval termination date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 26-704; WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003: provisions cited for maintaining and updating the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-a0069d/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-a0069d/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that the Department of War conditionally approved Vantiva USA, LLC’s CWA438TX router and therefore exempts that device from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix to reflect the approval. PSHSB determines that the approval is a “specific determination” that the device does not pose a risk to U.S. national security, requiring the Bureau to exclude it from the list. The notice also publishes the current Covered List and identifies prior conditional approvals for routers and uncrewed aircraft systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Vantiva USA, LLC and the CWA438TX router. It also informs equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies about the effect of the update. Other manufacturers and devices listed in Appendix B remain subject to their stated conditional-approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how a device otherwise covered by the March 2026 foreign-produced-router designation can be removed from the Covered List following an Executive Branch conditional approval. Covered List status affects FCC authorizations and related supply-chain restrictions; the exemption is time-limited.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 8, 2026; DA 26-688.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Vantiva CWA438TX approval runs July 8, 2026, through January 3, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to specified exceptions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Order Denying DigitalSystem 214</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-order-denying-digitalsystem-214-dc828a/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-order-denying-digitalsystem-214-dc828a/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC denies Digitalsystem Technology Inc.’s application for global facilities-based and global resale international section 214 authority because the record shows substantial national-security and law-enforcement risks that cannot be mitigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Memorandum Opinion and Order concludes that Digitalsystem is subject to the jurisdiction and control of the government of China through Hui Xie, a Chinese citizen who owns 70% of the company and holds majority control. It also finds that Digitalsystem’s Hong Kong affiliate and other actual or potential relationships, planned handling of U.S. customer records, cybersecurity practices, and lawful-intercept capabilities create exploitable vulnerabilities. The Commission relies on the totality of the unclassified record, including the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector’s recommendation; classified evidence provides additional support but is not necessary to the decision.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The decision directly affects Digitalsystem, its owners and proposed international telecommunications operations. It also reflects the Committee’s role in reviewing foreign-owned or foreign-controlled telecommunications applications under the Executive Branch foreign-participation process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The order emphasizes that mitigation depends on a baseline of trust, candor, and transparency. Digitalsystem’s conflicting or incomplete responses, combined with China-related jurisdictional and operational risks, led the FCC to find that it could not rely on the company to comply with or report violations of mitigation terms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Application filed March 26, 2024; Committee recommendation filed April 2, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Order adopted June 30, 2026, and released July 7, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 214 file: ITC-214-20240326-00054; FCC number: FCC 26-44.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Petitions for reconsideration may be filed within 30 days of release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Digitalsystem added to Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-digitalsystem-added-to-covered-list-b04176/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-digitalsystem-added-to-covered-list-b04176/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds Digitalsystem Technology Inc.’s section 214 international telecommunications services to the FCC Covered List based on a national-security determination by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice finds that the Committee’s recommendation to deny Digitalsystem’s international section 214 authorization application constitutes a specific determination under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act that the covered services pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the security and safety of U.S. persons. It updates the Covered List to include “International telecommunications services provided by Digitalsystem Technology Inc., subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.” The inclusion extends to Digitalsystem subsidiaries and affiliates, and the updated list and Committee recommendation are attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Digitalsystem and its subsidiaries and affiliates providing the specified international telecommunications services. It also concerns the FCC and the Committee, whose members are the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and War, as well as providers and applicants subject to the FCC’s Covered List and section 214 authorization regime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice links Covered List placement to the Executive Branch’s Team Telecom review process. The Committee cited potential exploitation by PRC- and Hong Kong-based threat actors, risks associated with Digitalsystem’s planned offerings and relationships, and infeasible mitigation measures. The FCC previously denied the application after allowing Digitalsystem an opportunity to respond.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released: July 7, 2026; DA 26-673.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Committee recommendation received by the FCC: April 3, 2026; the attached recommendation is dated April 1, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Application file: ITC-214-20240326-00054.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant authorities: section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601, and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Related FCC application decision: FCC 26-44, issued July 7, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pre-2024 Covered List Marketing Import Limitation</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pre-2024-covered-list-marketing-import-limitatio-85e98f/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pre-2024-covered-list-marketing-import-limitatio-85e98f/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology prohibit the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, while preserving existing users’ ability to operate equipment they already possess.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice applies the authorization-limitation framework established in the Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order to equipment authorized before the FCC’s 2022 rules and later placed on the Covered List. The prohibition excludes equipment added after 2024, including specified 2025 and 2026 additions. For use-based Covered List entries, the restriction applies only to covered uses; physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure is temporarily exempted until the FCC adopts a definition and guidance for “critical infrastructure.” Statutory and regulatory exceptions, including specified government marketing and importation circumstances, remain available.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Importers, marketers, authorization holders, distributors, and sellers of covered equipment are affected. Existing owners may continue using and operating legally purchased equipment. The action particularly concerns equipment associated with entities identified through congressional or national-security determinations, including Hikvision, Hytera, and equipment incorporating Kaspersky software.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC concludes that national-security risks outweigh economic and supply-chain concerns, rejecting requests for longer transition periods, phased implementation, replacement exemptions, or reimbursement. It states that the prohibition is intended to prevent continued deployment and market flooding of equipment previously determined to pose unacceptable risks, without revoking underlying authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 26, 2026; effective 10 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covers equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The March 27, 2026 comment Public Notice provided at least 30 days for public comment.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Equipment added to the initial 2021 listing has not received authorization since November 11, 2022.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The critical-infrastructure-use suspension ends when the FCC adopts a definition and interpretive guidance.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-812a40/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-812a40/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exclude specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers that received Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the DoW approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. It therefore updates the Covered List and publishes an accompanying inventory of approved devices. The June 22 approvals cover Real-Time Robotics’ HERA platform, Ceres Air’s C40, C31, C26, C20, and C6 platforms, and Hitron’s listed gateways, routers, and hotspots. The appendices also consolidate earlier approvals for additional UAS and router products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The exclusions affect manufacturers and suppliers of the approved devices, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications providers evaluating covered equipment. The notice identifies approvals for companies including SiFly, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Nokia, Arcadyan, Sagemcom, and Flock Safety, among others.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action clarifies how DoW or Department of Homeland Security Conditional Approvals operate as exceptions to broad Covered List categories for foreign-produced UAS and routers. It preserves the Covered List framework while allowing approved products to proceed outside those exclusions, subject to approval end dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 22, 2026 (DA 26-616).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;HERA and Ceres approvals terminate December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Hitron approvals terminate December 18, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Covered List Toy Drones Removal</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-toy-drones-removal-f177b2/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-toy-drones-removal-f177b2/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau removes foreign-produced “Toy Drones” and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components” from the FCC Covered List based on a Department of War determination that they do not pose an unacceptable national-security or U.S.-person safety risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice updates the Covered List under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and FCC rules §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003. The exemption applies only to devices meeting every criterion in the appended determination:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device is considered a Toy Drone only if it meets all of the below criteria:
• Maximum Take-off Weight is equal to or less than 150 grams;
• Operation is limited to line-of-sight operations equal to or less than 100 meters;
• Maximum sustained altitude must be equal to or less than 300 feet;
• No GPS/GNSS or equivalent system (e.g., no return-to-home, waypoint missions, or subject tracking);
• No connectivity or network capability (e.g., no connection to Internet, mobile apps, cellular networks, Wi-Fi), but may include a dedicated radio-frequency link between controller and drone, typically on 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz bands;
o Radio frequences and WiFi Channels may not be modifiable or programmable and must conform to FCC regulatory requirements;
• No imaging or sensing capabilities (e.g., no photo/video camera, microphones, live video feed, onboard recording, or sensors capable of surveillance or data gathering on the toy);
• Flight time must be equal to or less than 10 minutes;
• Maximum horizontal speed must be equal to or less than 10 meters/second;
• Explicitly marketed as a toy for recreational use;
• No modular payload interface, such as airdrop and release mechanisms, searchlights and strobes, and micro-FPV cameras and protection cages;
• Does not contain brushless motors; and
• Is not produced by an entity identified in Section 1709 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The change affects foreign-produced toy-drone manufacturers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies. It does not remove the broader foreign-produced UAS and UAS-critical-component category or other Covered List entries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice creates a narrowly defined exclusion from the UAS Covered List while preserving the broader restriction on foreign-produced UAS. The determination remains effective unless superseded, and FCC staff will provide implementation guidance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 12, 2026: DoW determination received by PSHSB.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 15, 2026: notice released and Covered List updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: foreign-produced UAS category originally added.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: existing Blue UAS and domestic-end-product exceptions remain scheduled to last until this date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-887b5e/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-887b5e/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers covered by Department of War Conditional Approvals are exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB updates the Covered List and publishes an accompanying list of Conditional Approvals. The notice recognizes DoW determinations that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. Newly identified approvals include Flock Group, Inc.’s Flock Alpha UAS and Miri Technologies, Inc.’s Miri X10 Travel router. Appendix B also lists earlier approvals for additional UAS and routers, with specified expiration dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers and users of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. Covered List restrictions continue to apply to devices outside the listed exemptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how agency-specific national-security determinations can narrow the scope of broad Covered List categories without removing those categories altogether. Conditional exemptions are time-limited and must be reflected in the FCC’s maintained list, creating ongoing compliance and authorization implications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 12, 2026, as DA 26-584.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Flock Alpha approval runs through December 31, 2026;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Miri X10 approval runs through December 12, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List’s foreign-produced UAS category and router category retain their broader exclusions for devices with DoW or DHS Conditional Approval.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Router Conditional Approvals 2nd</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-2nd-c9e7be/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-2nd-c9e7be/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau updates the Covered List to exempt specified foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers covered by Department of War Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice finds that the Department of War’s Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The appendices provide the June 12, 2026 Covered List and the current Conditional Approvals, including approvals for ABZ Innovation Kft.’s L50 UAS and Arcadyan Technology Corporation routers, plus previously approved devices from other manufacturers. The Bureau also notes that FCC staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects manufacturers and suppliers of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as entities seeking FCC equipment authorizations. It identifies exemptions for devices from ABZ Innovation, Arcadyan, Miri Technologies, Flock Safety, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Sagemcom, Blueflite, and Innovation First, among others listed in Appendix B.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice clarifies how Executive Branch national-security determinations and device-specific Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List. Covered-list treatment remains category-based for foreign-produced UAS and routers, but approved devices are excluded for the stated approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 12, 2026; DA 26-585.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ABZ L50 approval terminates December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Arcadyan router approval terminates December 12, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-8829e8/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-8829e8/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the FCC Covered List to exclude devices covered by Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, including Innovation First International’s VEX AIR uncrewed aircraft system and Sagemcom USA’s specified routers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that each Conditional Approval is a “specific determination” that the identified equipment does not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. It therefore updates the Covered List and publishes revised Covered List and Conditional Approvals appendices. The notice explains that foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers generally remain covered unless an applicable exception or Conditional Approval applies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly concerns producers and users of the listed UAS, UAS components, and routers, including Innovation First International, Sagemcom USA, and the companies identified in Appendix B. It also provides guidance context for telecommunications certification bodies, test laboratories, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice shows how executive-branch device-specific determinations alter the scope of the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions without removing the broader categories of foreign-produced UAS or routers from the Covered List. Conditional exclusions are time-limited and remain reflected in the FCC’s published lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 4, 2026; DA 26-548.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;VEX AIR approval runs through December 31, 2026; Sagemcom approvals run through December 5, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The notice identifies the Covered List as updated June 4, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-2f4276/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-2f4276/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified foreign-produced routers have received Department of War Conditional Approvals and are therefore exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals materials after DoW reviewed submissions and determined that Calix’s 7p6, 7u6m.2, 7u4txg, and 7u4 broadband routers, and Alpha Networks Inc. USA’s 1700 and 2700 series routers, do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security. The approvals expire November 22, 2027. PSHSB states that each approval is “a specific determination” supporting exclusion of the identified equipment and publishes updated appendices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Calix and Alpha Networks, manufacturers and suppliers of the identified routers, equipment authorization applicants, test labs, and telecommunications providers evaluating whether covered equipment may be authorized or deployed. It also provides guidance for TCBs and other stakeholders applying the updated Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List. Foreign-produced routers remain covered unless granted approval by DoW or DHS, while approved devices are excluded subject to the approval terms and expiration dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 1, 2026; DA 26-542.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Conditional Approvals for the Calix and Alpha Networks routers terminate November 22, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drone Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-conditional-approvals-3aa5ad/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-conditional-approvals-3aa5ad/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exempt UAS and UAS critical components receiving Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, while publishing the current Covered List and related approval lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB treats each DoW Conditional Approval as a “specific determination” that the covered device does not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security and U.S. persons, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The notice confirms approvals for Blueflite’s Cobalt 461 and related components, Verity AG’s Series 4 Indoor Autonomous Inventory System, and Air VEV’s 120C and 060C systems. Its updated appendices also identify previously approved UAS and router products, including devices from SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Air6 System, Elevon Aerial, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, and Nokia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies dealing with foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, or routers subject to the Covered List. It also provides guidance context for FCC staff reviewing authorization-related questions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates that the Covered List is dynamic: foreign-produced UAS and covered routers remain generally listed, but specific DoW or Department of Homeland Security determinations create product-level exemptions. The exemptions permit the identified equipment to fall outside the Covered List during the stated approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 26, 2026; DA 26-524.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The newly identified UAS approvals run through December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The notice’s Covered List identifies the foreign-produced UAS category as added December 22, 2025, with updates on January 7, March 18, and May 26, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router approvals listed in Appendix B extend into 2027, including Netgear approvals through October 1, 2027, and other approvals through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Drone Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-1e5ef7/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-1e5ef7/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the FCC Covered List to exclude specified routers that received Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, including Nokia Corporation’s Beacons, Open Network Terminal (ONT) Based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security and therefore concludes that it must update and maintain the Covered List to exclude them. The notice publishes the updated Covered List and a separate list of Conditional Approvals. The router approvals cover products from Netgear, Adtran, eero/Amazon Leo, Calix, and Nokia; the appendices also list Conditional Approvals for specified uncrewed aircraft systems and related equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects manufacturers and suppliers of the approved routers and UAS products, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. Nokia’s newly listed approvals cover its Beacons, ONT-based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers. The Covered List’s restrictions continue to apply to covered categories and named entities outside the stated exemptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and Conditional Approvals alter the scope of the FCC Covered List. Foreign-produced routers remain listed categorically unless granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or the Department of Homeland Security, while PSHSB provides staff guidance to TCBs, test labs, and applicants on the updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 18, 2026; DA 26-495 (the document footer identifies DA 26-489).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router approvals for Nokia’s Beacons, ONT-based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers run through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The foreign-produced-router category was added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Drone Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-e6b8b3/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-e6b8b3/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that Department of War Conditional Approvals require exclusion of specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates and republishes the Covered List and the related Conditional Approvals list as of May 15, 2026. It identifies new Conditional Approvals for Elevon Aerial AG’s Z30, Z50, and Z80 UAS, terminating December 31, 2026, and Nokia Corporation’s wireless-fidelity 8 router, terminating October 31, 2027. The appendices also list previously approved UAS and router devices, including products from SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Air6, Netgear, Adtran, eero, and Calix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers and suppliers of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies. Covered List exclusions apply to the specified devices, while the broader categories remain covered subject to stated exceptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how a specific national-security determination by the Department of War can narrow the operational scope of a Covered List category without removing the category itself. PSHSB states that it must maintain and update the list under 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003, and offers staff guidance on the updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 15, 2026; DA 26-489.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Elevon approvals terminate December 31, 2026; Nokia approval terminates October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;UAS were added to the Covered List on December 22, 2025; foreign-produced routers were added on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OET Waivers (UAS and routers) extended to 2029</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-waivers-extended-to-2029-6c94d5/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-waivers-extended-to-2029-6c94d5/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology extends through at least January 1, 2029, and expands waivers allowing certain already-authorized covered UAS, UAS critical components, and routers to receive consumer-protective software and firmware updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET continues its prior waivers from the prohibitions in 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) for Class I permissive changes involving software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers. The extension applies to covered UAS and UAS critical components authorized before their December 22, 2025, Covered List addition, and covered routers authorized before their March 23, 2026, addition. It also adds analogous relief for Class II permissive changes. Covered updates include patches for vulnerabilities, continued device functionality, and operating-system compatibility. The waiver does not remove other FCC filing, testing, performance, marketing, or certification requirements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Manufacturers and grantees of already-authorized foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers covered by the FCC rules may continue qualifying updates. It does not authorize new covered equipment or changes beyond the specified Class I and Class II software and firmware updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without relief, the revised equipment-authorization rules could block security and safety updates for devices added to the Covered List. OET finds that extending the limited waiver serves the public interest while allowing the Commission to consider codifying the policy through rulemaking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;May 8, 2026: waiver extension and expansion released; DA 26-454.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2029: waiver period extends at least through this date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: covered UAS and UAS critical components were added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: covered routers were added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232; governing provisions include 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Drone Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-543f2f/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-543f2f/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers have received Department of War Conditional Approvals and are therefore exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix. The newly identified approvals cover Air6 System GmbH’s listed AIR8 and AIR4 UAS and Calix, Inc.’s 7u6.2 router, part number 100-06200. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List and the existing approvals for UAS and routers, including approvals for SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Netgear, Adtran, and eero.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers, suppliers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, telecommunications providers, and entities seeking to use or obtain FCC authorizations for covered equipment. Devices produced in foreign countries remain covered unless an applicable exception or Conditional Approval applies; staff guidance remains available to TCBs, test labs, and applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how specific executive-branch determinations modify the practical scope of the Covered List without removing the broader categories of foreign-produced UAS, UAS components, or routers. It also provides an official, dated reference for the approval status and expiration periods of named devices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 6, 2026; DA 26-437.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Air6 approval terminates December 31, 2026; Calix approval terminates October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List’s foreign-produced UAS category was added December 22, 2025; foreign-produced routers were added March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-0bb647/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-0bb647/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PSHSB announces that the Department of War’s conditional approval of specified eero and Amazon Leo routers requires their exclusion from the FCC Covered List until October 31, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice explains the Covered List treatment of foreign-produced routers and records a DoW Conditional Approval for eero LLC’s eero, eero Pro, eero Max, eero PoE, eero Outdoor, eero Signal, and Amazon Leo routers. PSHSB determines that the approval is “a specific determination” that the devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security, and updates the Covered List and related conditional-approval materials accordingly. Appendices A and B provide the updated Covered List and conditional-approval tables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects eero LLC and the identified router products, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies that rely on the Covered List. It also informs manufacturers of foreign-produced routers that they may seek evaluation by DoW or DHS for a Conditional Approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to an exception for routers receiving DoW or DHS approval. This notice illustrates how an executive-branch national-security determination changes the scope of the FCC restriction and confirms PSHSB’s role in maintaining and updating the list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released April 22, 2026; DA 26-390.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;eero/Amazon Leo Conditional Approval runs through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Updated Covered List and conditional-approval tables appear in Appendices A and B.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Drone Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-8b2ebb/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-8b2ebb/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exempt specified routers and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components covered by Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the listed Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The April 14, 2026 approvals cover &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;’s v.USA. 1.0 UAS; Netgear, Inc.’s identified Nighthawk, Orbi, cable gateway, and cable modem series; and Adtran Inc.’s Service Delivery Gateway class routers. The appended approval table also records earlier approvals for SiFly Aviation, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, and Verge UAS products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The update affects manufacturers and suppliers of the identified foreign-produced routers, UAS, and UAS critical components, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. It also guides FCC staff and regulated parties applying the Covered List rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and DoW or DHS Conditional Approvals alter the scope of the FCC Covered List. It provides a limited exemption rather than a general authorization for foreign-produced routers or UAS, and makes the exemptions time-limited.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released April 14, 2026; DA 26-351.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt; UAS approval terminates December 31, 2026; Netgear and Adtran approvals terminate October 1, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List was updated for foreign-produced routers on March 23, 2026, and for certain UAS approvals on March 18, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PN Seeking Comment on pre-2024 Covered List Limitation</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-pre-2024-covered-list-limi-6bf8f8/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-pre-2024-covered-list-limi-6bf8f8/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s PSHSB and OET propose limiting existing equipment authorizations to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, while preserving the use and operation of equipment already purchased.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice initiates a comment proceeding on applying the authority established in the FCC’s 2025 Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order. The proposed limitation would cover equipment authorized before the FCC’s 2022 rules and added to the Covered List by 2024, but not equipment added in 2025 or later. The agencies seek comment on national-security, economic, supply-chain, use-based, and other public-interest considerations. They also propose requiring parties to cease importation and marketing within 30 days after any prohibition becomes effective.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proposal would affect manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, communications providers, consumers, government partners, and holders of existing equipment authorizations. It would not revoke those authorizations or prohibit continued operation of devices already in users’ hands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding could extend the Covered List regime from blocking new equipment authorizations to restricting the commercial supply of previously authorized equipment. The agencies tentatively find that national-security benefits outweigh economic and supply-chain concerns, noting that Kaspersky-related equipment is already subject to Commerce restrictions and that older covered equipment has not received new authorization since November 11, 2022.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released March 27, 2026; comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed scope: Covered List additions in 2024 or earlier, authorized before the 2022 rules.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed cessation period: 30 days after the prohibition’s effective date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proceeding: PS Docket No. 26-72; DA 26-294.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Permissive Change Waiver</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-permissive-change-waiver-3df6e9/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-permissive-change-waiver-3df6e9/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) temporarily waives prohibitions on certain Class I permissive changes for covered routers authorized before the March 23, 2026, Covered List addition, allowing specified software and firmware updates through March 1, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET waives the application of 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) to software and firmware updates for previously authorized routers that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers. Covered updates include patches for vulnerabilities, updates needed to maintain device functionality, and changes facilitating compatibility with different operating systems. The waiver applies to routers produced in a foreign country that were authorized before their addition to the Covered List, and OET will reevaluate whether to extend it before the expiration date.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The relief applies to all covered routers authorized for use in the United States before March 23, 2026, including consumer-grade networking devices within the document’s cited definition. It affects manufacturers and other parties responsible for maintaining those devices, while preserving the underlying Covered List and equipment-authorization restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without the waiver, the revised certification rules would bar even Class I permissive changes to previously authorized routers once they became covered equipment. The temporary exception allows security and safety updates to continue while the Commission considers how its October 2025 rule revisions apply to the new router designation. OET grounds the waiver in special circumstances and the public interest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: Routers were added to the Covered List and the waiver was released.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 1, 2027: Waiver expiration and target date for OET reevaluation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR §§ 2.932(b), 2.1043(b): Rules whose prohibitions are waived for the specified updates.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 26-286; ET Docket No. 21-232: Document identifiers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-covered-list-8cb970/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-covered-list-8cb970/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds routers produced in a foreign country to the FCC Covered List, subject to Conditional Approvals from the Department of War (DoW) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice adopts a National Security Determination received by the FCC on March 20, 2026, finding that foreign-produced routers pose unacceptable risks involving supply-chain vulnerabilities and severe cybersecurity threats. The Covered List entry is: “Routers produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.” The notice explains that production generally includes major stages such as manufacturing, assembly, design, and development. It also provides submission guidance for Conditional Approvals, which may last up to 18 months and require corporate, supply-chain, and U.S. manufacturing information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action applies regardless of the producer’s nationality to entities producing routers abroad, equipment-authorization applicants, test laboratories, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers. Covered equipment may not receive FCC equipment authorization, and applicants must certify that equipment is not prohibited as covered equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Definition of router&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;quot;Routers: For the purpose of this determination, the term “Routers” is defined by [NIST] Internal Report 8425A to include consumer-grade networking devices that are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action extends the Covered List from identified entities and other equipment categories to a place-of-production category. It is intended to address risks associated with compromised routers, including network surveillance, data exfiltration, botnets, unauthorized access, and disruption of critical infrastructure, while providing a DoW/DHS exemption pathway.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 20, 2026: National Security Determination received and Conditional Approval guidance dated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: Public Notice released and router category included on the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Conditional Approvals may be granted for up to 18 months.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant authorities include 47 U.S.C. § 1601 and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003, 2.903, and 2.911.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UAS First Conditional Approvals</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-uas-first-conditional-approvals-7ef9ff/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-uas-first-conditional-approvals-7ef9ff/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that four specified UAS or UAS-related product sets received Department of War conditional approvals and are therefore excluded from the FCC Covered List through December 31, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice updates the Covered List’s UAS entry under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the FCC’s rules. It recognizes DoW’s individual determinations as “specific determination[s]” that the identified devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security, and publishes the revised list in Appendix A and the approved devices in Appendix B. The revised UAS entry also retains exclusions for items on the DCMA Blue UAS Cleared List and qualifying domestic end products, each until January 1, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The conditional approvals cover SiFly Aviation’s Q12 UAS; Mobilicom’s SkyHopper Series, M Band, Tactical Data Link, various controllers, and ICE/OS3 Security Software; ScoutDI’s Scout 137 UAS; and Verge’s X1 UAS. They also affect equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies that rely on the Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice creates a targeted path out of the UAS Covered List while preserving the broader inclusion of foreign-produced UAS and critical components. The approvals are time-limited, so the listed devices remain exempt only through the end of 2026 unless further action occurs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 18, 2026: Notice released and Covered List updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 17–December 31, 2026: Conditional-approval period for each listed device or product set.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: Existing Blue UAS and domestic-end-product exclusions expire.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: Foreign-produced UAS and critical components were initially added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Four entities received conditional approvals:&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;SiFly Aviation’s Q12 UAS;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mobilicom’s SkyHopper Series, M Band, Tactical Data Link, various controllers, and ICE/OS3 Security Software;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ScoutDI’s Scout 137 UAS;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Verge’s X1 UAS.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OET Class I Permissive Change Waiver</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-class-i-permissive-change-waiver-65da39/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-class-i-permissive-change-waiver-65da39/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) temporarily waives prohibitions on certain Class I permissive changes for previously authorized covered uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET applies the waiver to software and firmware updates for Covered UAS and UAS critical components that were authorized before the December 22, 2025, Covered List addition, when the updates mitigate harm to U.S. consumers. Covered updates include those needed to maintain device functionality, patch vulnerabilities, and facilitate compatibility with different operating systems. The waiver addresses prohibitions in 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b), which otherwise exclude Covered List equipment from certification procedures allowing permissive changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects authorized UAS and UAS critical components subject to the Covered List addition, as well as manufacturers and other parties responsible for providing their software and firmware updates. It does not cover every possible modification; its stated scope is updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The waiver preserves the ability to issue safety, security, and functionality updates despite the newly applicable Covered List restrictions. OET finds that special circumstances and the public interest justify a limited departure from the general rules, while retaining time to assess the effect of the Commission’s October 2025 rule revisions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 21, 2026: waiver released.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: Covered UAS and UAS critical components were added to the Covered List, triggering the issue addressed here.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: waiver expiration date, subject to possible extension after OET re-evaluation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR §§ 2.932(b), 2.1043(b), and 2.903: relevant equipment authorization and Covered List provisions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232; DA 26-69.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Second UAS Covered List Blue UAS</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-second-uas-covered-list-blue-uas-513807/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-second-uas-covered-list-blue-uas-513807/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau updates the Covered List to exempt specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components based on a January 7, 2026 Department of War national security determination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice removes from the Covered List, until January 1, 2027, UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS Cleared List and those qualifying as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard in 48 CFR § 25.101(a). The updated list continues to cover foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, subject to those exemptions, as well as communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709(a)(1) of the FY2025 NDAA. Appendix B reproduces the supporting DoW determination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects UAS manufacturers, component suppliers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. It also guides FCC staff and TCBs on applying the revised Covered List. The exemptions concern systems and components on the Blue UAS lists and products meeting the Buy American domestic-end-product standard; the latter requires U.S. manufacture and domestic component costs exceeding 65 percent of the finished product’s total cost.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice creates temporary, defined exclusions from the FCC’s foreign-produced UAS restriction while preserving the broader national-security control. It ties eligibility to DoW’s security assessment and domestic-content criteria, with both determinations subject to reassessment before expiration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: FCC added foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 7, 2026: DoW determination and FCC update released.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: Blue UAS and domestic-end-product exemptions terminate unless superseded or reassessed.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;65%: minimum domestic-component cost share stated for the domestic-end-product standard.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>First UAS Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-first-uas-covered-list-6e4dab/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-first-uas-covered-list-6e4dab/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and the communications and video surveillance equipment and services identified in section 1709(a)(1) of the FY2025 NDAA to the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice implements a December 21, 2025 National Security Determination, concluding that the statutory conditions for updating the Covered List are satisfied. The new category covers foreign-produced UAS and critical components—including data transmission devices, communications systems, flight controllers, ground control stations, controllers, navigation systems, sensors and cameras, batteries, battery-management systems, and motors—subject to possible exclusions based on a specific determination by the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. The updated list is attached as Appendix A.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The change affects manufacturers, providers, importers, equipment-authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications and public-safety users dealing in covered equipment. Covered equipment is prohibited from receiving FCC equipment authorization, and applicants must certify that equipment is not covered. The new UAS category is identified by place of production rather than by entity, while the Appendix also continues to list named companies and their affiliates and subsidiaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action expands the Covered List beyond previously named telecommunications, surveillance, cybersecurity, and international-telecommunications providers to a broad foreign-production category for UAS and critical components. The determination cites risks involving unauthorized surveillance, data exfiltration, remote access, disabling through software updates, attacks, and supply-chain dependence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released and Covered List updated: December 22, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;National Security Determination received: December 21, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Authorities: Secure Networks Act section 2; FY2025 NDAA section 1709; 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003, 2.903(a), and 2.911.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Docket and release identifier: DA 25-1086; WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EA Security 2.0</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-ea-security-2nd-ro-bd58d8/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-ea-security-2nd-ro-bd58d8/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC strengthens its Covered List equipment-authorization regime by barring authorization of covered modular transmitters and devices containing them, creating a prospective process to stop importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment, and seeking further comment on related controls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Second Report and Order clarifies that the existing prohibition on authorizing covered equipment applies to modular transmitters—including single, split, and limited modular transmitters—and to host devices incorporating them, even where a module was previously authorized. It adopts a procedure allowing the FCC to limit an existing authorization to prohibit future importation and marketing without revoking the authorization or disrupting users’ continued operation. It also gives “produced by” a broad, fact-specific meaning, covering substantial responsibility or control over major stages such as design, manufacture, assembly, or development, and clarifies restrictions on modifications. The accompanying Second Further Notice seeks comment on modules and other component parts, critical infrastructure, permissive changes, marketing, and enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Equipment applicants, responsible parties, manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, original equipment manufacturers, grantees, and telecommunications certification bodies must account for the expanded authorization restrictions and attestations. Covered List entities and suppliers of affected equipment are especially impacted; current users may continue operating equipment subject to a future limitation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The item closes a potential pathway for covered equipment to enter devices as a component while avoiding the economic and consumer disruption of mandatory replacement. It also responds to the D.C. Circuit’s partial remand concerning the FCC’s prior critical-infrastructure definition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted October 28, 2025; released October 29, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Comments due 30 days after Federal Register publication; replies due 45 days after publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proceeding: ET Docket No. 21-232; FCC 25-71.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The FCC directs OET and PSHSB to begin proceedings concerning equipment currently on the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>HK Telecom Order to Show Cause 214</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-hk-telecom-order-to-show-cause-214-07cd87/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-hk-telecom-order-to-show-cause-214-07cd87/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC directs HKT and four wholly owned subsidiaries to show cause why their domestic and international section 214 authority should not be revoked or terminated based on national-security, law-enforcement, Covered List, compliance, and character concerns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The order identifies HKT’s twelve international section 214 authorizations and its domestic blanket authority, and directs HKT to explain why the Commission should not revoke its domestic authority and revoke and terminate its international authority. PCCW Global, PCCW Global Limited, Gateway Global Communications, and PCCW Global (UK) Limited must explain why their domestic authority should not be revoked. The required response covers ownership and control, management, foreign-government relationships, services, infrastructure, customer records, equipment, network operations, and compliance with the 2001 national-security agreement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The order directly affects HKT and its four subsidiaries, their U.S. and international telecommunications operations, customers, and counterparties. It also concerns China Unicom, SASAC, and the FBI, DOJ, and DHS agreement associated with the authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC treats HKT and its subsidiaries as affiliates of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited and therefore as covered by the Covered List’s treatment of affiliates. The order applies the Commission’s prior reasoning about PRC ownership, influence, and control while preserving an opportunity to respond; it is not itself a final revocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released October 15, 2025; response due within 30 calendar days.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;HKT holds 12 international section 214 authorizations.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The order requests ownership and control information beginning at the 5% threshold.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;HKT’s international authorities date from 1998–2003; the relevant national-security agreement dates from November 29, 2001.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Covered List NatSec Advisory Subs Affil</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-natsec-advisory-subs-affil-0d6727/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-natsec-advisory-subs-affil-0d6727/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC reiterates that equipment and services on its Covered List have been determined to pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security and urges organizations and individuals to review the List and consider those risks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Advisory describes covered telecommunications, video-surveillance, information-security, cybersecurity, anti-virus, and international telecommunications services associated with the named entities. It explains that the Covered List determinations extend to relevant subsidiaries and affiliates, and attaches two appendices: Appendix A lists subsidiaries and affiliates reported by select covered entities, while Appendix B lists 129 entities identified by Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd. as associated entities. The FCC cautions that the appendices are not comprehensive and that the online Covered List may change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The guidance is directed to organizations and individuals using or considering purchasing, importing, marketing, selling, providing, receiving, or interconnecting with covered equipment or services. It identifies products or services associated with Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua, Kaspersky, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas), Pacific Networks, ComNet, and China Unicom (Americas).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The Advisory consolidates the FCC’s current national-security warning and highlights that covered equipment or services may enable surveillance, disrupt communications networks, or otherwise threaten national security. It also makes associated-entity information available for compliance review while emphasizing that listed entities may be subject to Commission prohibitions even if they do not currently provide covered communications equipment or services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released October 14, 2025, as National Security Advisory No. 2025-01 and DA 25-927.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Appendix A information is stated as of October 10, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Zhejiang Dahua’s Appendix B filing, dated September 22, 2025, identifies 129 associated entities.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings include ET Docket No. 21-232 and ET Docket No. 24-136.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bad Labs 1.0 R&amp;O</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-bad-labs-1-0-r-o-6990e0/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-bad-labs-1-0-r-o-6990e0/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC adopts rules barring untrusted or national-security-risk entities from participating in, or being relied upon for, the telecommunications equipment authorization program, while seeking comment on further safeguards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Report and Order defines “prohibited entities” to include entities on the FCC Covered List; the BIS Entity List and Military End-User List; the DHS Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List; the FY2023 NDAA section 5949 semiconductor-company list; the DoD 1260H List; the Treasury NS-CMIC List; and entities identified as foreign adversaries by Commerce. The FCC will not recognize, and will prohibit reliance on, any telecommunications certification body (TCB), test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. It treats 10% or greater equity or voting interests as ownership, requires certifications and disclosures, and authorizes withdrawal of recognition for false, inaccurate, or missing information. The accompanying FNPRM seeks comment on broader prohibitions, U.S. or allied-country testing, and post-market surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; FCC-recognized TCBs, test labs, laboratory accreditation bodies, equipment-certification applicants, and entities using the Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity process are directly affected. The rule reaches participants regardless of location and covers listed entities including SMIC, CXMT, and YMTC, as well as entities tied to the People’s Republic of China or Nicolas Maduro under the applicable determinations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The decision extends national-security screening beyond the Covered List and embeds multiple federal supply-chain and export-control determinations into FCC equipment authorization. It also addresses a program in which approximately 75% of certified devices were tested in recognized laboratories located in China.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted May 22, 2025; released May 27, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Certification due within 30 days after the rules’ effective date; reporting of equity or voting interests of 5% or greater due within 90 days.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;10% ownership threshold for prohibition; 30-day initial and 60-day reply comment periods for the FNPRM after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Prohibiting EA for Kaspersky</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-prohibiting-ea-for-kaspersky-643a01/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-prohibiting-ea-for-kaspersky-643a01/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2024 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology and Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau confirm that equipment integrating Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software is prohibited from obtaining FCC equipment authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice explains the effect of adding Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software to the FCC Covered List. It states that equipment integrating software produced or provided by Kaspersky, or any successor or assignee, is “covered” equipment under the Commission’s equipment-authorization rules and therefore cannot receive authorization. PSHSB also updates the Covered List’s wording to expressly include equipment with integrated Kaspersky software and reproduces the full updated list in an appendix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The prohibition applies to manufacturers, suppliers, and other parties seeking FCC authorization for equipment that integrates Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software. The notice also identifies Kaspersky and its successors or assignees, while noting the relationship to the Commerce Department’s ICTS determination concerning Kaspersky products, services, and third-party integrations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice connects the FCC’s equipment-authorization consequence to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and to Commerce’s June 2024 finding that Kaspersky transactions pose undue and unacceptable national-security and U.S.-person security risks. It also documents the Covered List’s expanded scope beyond standalone software to integrated hardware.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;September 3, 2024: Notice released and Covered List updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 23, 2024: Kaspersky software was added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 24, 2024: Commerce issued its Kaspersky Final Determination, Case No. ICTS-2021-002, published at 89 Fed. Reg. 52434.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 C.F.R. § 2.903: FCC equipment-authorization provision cited by the notice.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 24-886; WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Covered List Kaspersky ICTS hardware</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-kaspersky-icts-hardware-61b775/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-kaspersky-icts-hardware-61b775/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2024 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds Kaspersky Lab, Inc.’s cybersecurity and anti-virus software to the FCC’s Covered List based on a Department of Commerce ICTS Final Determination finding unacceptable national-security and U.S.-person security risks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List under section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and FCC rules §§ 1.50002–1.50003. The added entry covers cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced or provided by Kaspersky Lab, Inc., including its successors and assignees; the notice explains that the broader action encompasses software integrated into third-party products or services and related commercial hardware or software containing Kaspersky software. The complete updated list appears in the Appendix and on the FCC website.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action concerns Kaspersky, its affiliates, subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, and assignees, as well as U.S. persons and entities using, supplying, integrating, or purchasing affected cybersecurity and anti-virus products or services. It supplements the March 2022 Covered List entry for information-security products, solutions, and services supplied by AO Kaspersky Lab and related entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC update implements a Commerce determination under the ICTS regime rather than making an independent risk finding. It expands the Kaspersky-related Covered List category beyond the earlier DHS-based entry, aligning the FCC supply-chain list with Commerce’s June 20, 2024 prohibition on specified ICTS transactions involving Kaspersky products and services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 23, 2024: Public Notice released; Kaspersky software added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 20, 2024: Commerce issued the relevant ICTS Final Determination; it was published at 89 Fed. Reg. 52434 on June 24, 2024.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 24-712; WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 25, 2022: Earlier AO Kaspersky Lab information-security entry was added.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Covered List China Unicom PacNet</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-china-unicom-pacnet-fe3156/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-china-unicom-pacnet-fe3156/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2022 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds the international section 214 services of Pacific Networks Corp. (PacNet), ComNet (USA) LLC, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited to the Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice implements Executive Branch determinations transmitted through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and confirmed by the Department of Justice, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense. It finds that the identified services pose an “unacceptable risk” to U.S. national security or the security and safety of U.S. persons, and updates the Covered List accordingly. The inclusion extends to subsidiaries and affiliates of the named entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly covers PacNet and its wholly owned subsidiary ComNet, and China Unicom’s international telecommunications services subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934. It also informs communications providers, customers, and entities relying on the FCC’s Covered List for supply-chain and national-security screening.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice records Executive Branch concerns about Chinese government exploitation, influence, and control; compelled interception; cyber activity; economic espionage; and the targeting, collection, alteration, blocking, or rerouting of U.S. communications and sensitive data. It also illustrates the Bureau’s mandatory process for adding services when an enumerated national-security source makes the requisite determination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released September 20, 2022 (DA 22-979).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;PacNet/ComNet and China Unicom services were added with an inclusion date of September 20, 2022.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The action relies on sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure Networks Act and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002 and 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Second Covered List China Mobile Telecom Kaspersky</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-second-covered-list-china-mobile-telecom-kaspers-43ebaf/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-second-covered-list-china-mobile-telecom-kaspers-43ebaf/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Mar 2022 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds Kaspersky-branded information-security products and specified China Mobile and China Telecom services to the Communications Act Section 2 Covered List, including the named entities’ subsidiaries and affiliates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice explains that the Bureau identified one Department of Homeland Security determination and two Team Telecom determinations satisfying the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and FCC rules. It adds information security products, solutions, and services supplied directly or indirectly by AO Kaspersky Lab and its corporate family; international telecommunications services provided by China Mobile International USA Inc. subject to Section 214; and telecommunications services provided by China Telecom (Americas) Corp. subject to Section 214. The Appendix also reproduces the previously listed Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua categories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The additions apply to providers and users of the covered equipment or services, including subsidiaries and affiliates of the named companies. They reflect DHS’s 2017 Binding Operational Directive concerning Kaspersky products and Team Telecom findings about China Mobile and China Telecom services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice implements the FCC’s mandatory Covered List maintenance process. Once an enumerated national-security source determines that equipment or services pose, and are capable of posing, an unacceptable national-security risk, the FCC incorporates that determination into the list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released March 25, 2022; DA 22-320.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;WC Docket No. 18-89.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Three determinations support the additions: one DHS and two Team Telecom.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Appendix identifies March 25, 2022 as the inclusion date for all three new entries.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>First Covered List PN Huawei ZTE</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-first-covered-list-pn-huawei-zte-372a61/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-first-covered-list-pn-huawei-zte-372a61/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announced and published the first Covered List under section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 and the Commission’s supply-chain rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice publishes a Covered List and adds:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;“telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Huawei [Technologies Company] or ZTE [Corporation] capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A),(B), or (C) of the Secure Networks Act”;  and
(2) video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company,
and Dahua Technology Company “‘to the extent it is used for public safety or security,’ capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of the Secure Networks Act.”&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The publication directly concerns the five named manufacturers and providers (Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua), &lt;strong&gt;their subsidiaries and affiliates,&lt;/strong&gt; and communications providers, purchasers, and recipients of federal support subject to the Secure Networks Act’s supply-chain restrictions and reimbursement framework.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; This establishes the FCC’s initial public baseline for equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable national-security or safety risk. The Bureau states that it will update the list when it becomes aware of equipment or services meeting the statutory and regulatory criteria.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released and list entries dated March 12, 2021.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Secure Networks Act section 2 required website publication by March 12, 2021.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;WC Docket No. 18-89; DA 21-309.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR § 1.50002 governed publication; related rules were effective March 15, 2021.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
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